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PARTIES
The only parties to this action are those named in the caption.

JURISDICTION
This Court is authorized by Section 78-2A-3(c), Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended), to hear this appeal from the Small Claims
Division of the Circuit Court.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the judge pro tern of
the Small Claims Division of the Circuit Court in a civil action for a
deficiency judgment.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the pro tern judge commit clear error by failing to recuse

himself since he had previously represented the Plaintiffs in that he had

appeared as Sandy City Prosecutor in cases in which they were his chief
witnesses?
2.

Did the judge pro tern err in sanctioning or condoning the

Plaintiffs' self-help enforcement of a non-existent security interest with
respect to equipment that they had previously sold to Plaintiff?
3.

Did the trial judge err in failing to recognize that the

Plaintiffs were estopped to assert Defendant's technical default under the
verbal contract of sale since (i) Plaintiffs and their agents had twice before
rejected Defendant's tender of the full remaining purchase price and (ii)
Defendant was only one month and four days delinquent with respect to the
July 10, 1987, payment when the Plaintiffs "repossessed" the equipment on
August 14, 1987, even though, by Plaintiffs' own testimony, Defendant had
frequently been 60 to 90 days delinquent on his payments and no previous
demand for payment had been made by the Plaintiffs prior to their
"repossession" of the equipment.
4.

Assuming, arguendo, the existence of a valid security interest,

were Plaintiffs precluded from a deficiency judgment until such time as there
had been a commercially reasonable sale of the collateral?

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
No statute per se mandates a judge's recusal when, as in the
present case, a party was a favorable witness in a case in which the now
judge was then counsel. However, Canon 2, Canon 3 (Subpart C) Section
78-7-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), and Rule 63(b) of the Utah

2

Rules of Civil Procedure are helpful in the analysis of this issue.

These

authorities are reproduced in the Addendum, infra, at A-l through A-5.
No statute or common law of the state of Utah permits a
"repossession" of personal property as to which the vendor (/.&, Plaintiffs)
have failed to retain a security interest. Since there was no written contract
in this case, as required by Sections 70A-2-201 and 70A-9-203, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended), there could be no security interest as defined
in Section 70A-1-201(37) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), and
Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. While the "savings" provision of
Section 70A-2-201(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), may allow the
enforceability of a verbal contract, it does not sanction the enforcement of a
nonexistent security interest.

These statutes are reproduced in the

Addendum, infra at A-6 through A-9.
Sections 70A-9-504 and 70A-9-505(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended), govern the disposition of collateral

and the rights and

responsibilities of the creditors after repossession.

These statutes are

reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-10 through A-ll.

DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
A hearing was held on November 18, 1987, in the Small Claims
Division of the Sandy Circuit Court, Mark Ethington presiding as Judge pro
tern. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Ethington took the matter
under advisement. An unsigned document, on Fifth Circuit Court letterhead,
dated December 21, 1987, was apparently prepared with the intent that it
serve as the Court's "written opinion." (This document is reproduced in the
3

Addendum, infra, at A-12.)

The Small Claims Judgment was entered on

December 21, 1987, over the signature of Judge Ethington. (A copy of this
Judgment is reproduced in the Addendum, infra, at A-14.) This Judgment was
originally dated November 18, 1987, that date was crossed out and replaced
with December 17, 1987, and that date was eventually crossed out and
replaced with the date of December 21,1987. This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In April of 1986, Plaintiffs, two Sandy City policemen doing
business as "K.B. Enterprises," sold a piece of construction equipment to
Defendant.1

Defendant never signed any written agreement because the

contract that Plaintiffs drafted failed to reflect accurately the terms of the
transaction. It was not disputed that the sale was based upon twenty-four
(24) monthly payments of $324.64, which Defendant was to make directly to
Plaintiffs' bank. The bank held a security interest in the piece of equipment
and Plaintiffs' unpaid balance to the bank, at all times, significantly exceeded
the aggregate of all payments agreed to be made by Defendant. In other
words, the Plaintiffs had a substantial negative equity in the piece of
equipment.
Between the date of the contract and July of 1987, and therefore
prior to the default at issue, Defendant twice tendered full payment of the

1

Pursuant to this Court's Administrative Order No. 1, dated April 7,
1987, and paragraph 2(H)(1) thereof in particular, Appellant relies upon the
audio recording of the proceedings in the trial court in order to avoid the
cost of a transcript. This procedure appears to preclude, as a practical
matter, citation to the trial transcript.
4

remaining balance due to Plaintiffs; however, Plaintiffs rejected these tenders,
apparently because they could not provide clear title to the equipment, since
they owed their bank far more than they had agreed to accept in total from
the Defendant.

It was the Plaintiffs' testimony at trial that the Defendant

was consistently 60 to 90 days late in making his monthly payments and the
Defendant acknowledged that he was often late during the winter months,
during which there was no use for the equipment and his income was
diminished.
It was undisputed at trial that all payments becoming due through
and including the June 10, 1987, payment were, in fact, paid by the Defendant
but it was also undisputed that the Defendant had not paid the July 10, 1987,
payment by August 14, 1987. Although they had no written documentation
and, therefore, could have no perfected security interest, the Plaintiffs
proceeded by self-help to "repossess" the equipment on August 14, 1987. At
no time did Plaintiffs return or tender the return of the equipment to
Defendant.
The small claims judge awarded Plaintiffs judgment for $649.28,
apparently under the belief that Plaintiffs were entitled to retain the property
that they had sold to Defendant and hold Defendant liable for all payments
coming due under the verbal contract prior to the date of the "repossession."
The small claims judge, a former Sandy City Prosecutor, informed
the Defendant that he was personally acquainted with both Plaintiffs.

The

judge affirmatively asserted, however, that he thought he could be fair. The
judge had prosecuted several criminal cases incident to which the Plaintiffs
appeared as chief prosecution witnesses and had thus acted in the role of
5

counsel for the Plaintiffs. Defendant inquired if the matter could be raised
on appeal and was essentially assured that it could be.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since the pro tern had previously represented the Plaintiffs in
court, in that they had appeared as his chief witnesses in cases in which he
appeared as Sandy City Prosecutor, the pro tern committed clear error by
failing to recuse himself.
Plaintiffs sold the equipment to Defendant on the basis of a verbal
agreement.

There was no written retention of a security interest and,

therefore, Plaintiffs held no security interest in the property. Accordingly,
the pro tern erred in sanctioning Plaintiffs' self-help enforcement of a nonexistent security interest.
It was undisputed at trial that Defendant had frequently been 60 to
90 days late in his payments. The Plaintiffs had consistently accepted these
late payments.

Without any advance notice to Defendant, Plaintiffs then

suddenly proceeded to "repossess" the equipment at a time when the payment
was only one month and four days late. Under these circumstances, the trial
judge erred in failing to recognize that the Plaintiffs were estopped by their
consistent acceptance of late payments from "repossessing" the equipment
without advance warning. Moreover, Defendant had at least twice tendered
full payment of all amounts still due to the Plaintiffs but these offers had
been rejected by the Plaintiffs, apparently because they could not secure
clear title to the equipment because they owed far more to their bank on a

6

loan secured by the equipment than they had agreed to accept from
Defendant.
Finally, even assuming arguendo the existence of a valid security
agreement, the trial court erred in awarding what amounts to a deficiency
judgment since there had been no commercially reasonable sale of the
collateral following its "repossession."

ARGUMENT

POINT I: THE JUDGE PRO TEM COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR BY
FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF.
In a small claims action, it is generally accepted that the
procedures are somewhat informal to accommodate the parties' pro se
appearances. As a practical matter, the small claims judge must evaluate the
facts and apply the law to those facts, whether or not the parties use the
appropriate legal terms.

The small claims judges must adhere to the

applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and, in the context of
the small claims setting, must be extraordinarily conscientious in informing
the parties of their procedural rights.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, provides:
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All His Activities.
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and
should conduct himself at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
7

B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other
relationships to influence his judicial conduct or
judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his
office to advance the private interests of others; nor
should he convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to
influence him . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Canon 3 more specifically provides:
A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office
Impartially and Diligently.
In the performance of [judicial] duties, the following
standards apply:

C. Disqualification
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a
proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party, . . .
(Emphasis added.)
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, familiar to attorneys but not
generally to pro se parties, provides at Rule 63 an avenue for the petition of
judicial disqualification upon an affidavit of bias. It is not a decision to be
made by the judge against whom the affidavit was filed. Rule 63 requires
another judge of the same court or a court of like jurisdiction to determine
the legal sufficiency of the affidavit of bias. Furthermore, the spirit of the
essential need for an unbiased judiciary is expressed by the legislature in
Section 78-7-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), as follows:
8

Except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge
or justice of the peace shall sit or act as such in any
action or proceeding:
(1) To which he is a party, or in which he is
interested.

(3) When he has been attorney or counsel for either
party in the action or proceeding.
If not by its terms mandating the judge's recusal in this instance, the spirit
of the statute, the Rule, and the Canons set forth above clearly demonstrate
that the pro tern should have recused himself from this case.
In this instance, the judge was not only acquainted with Plaintiffs
but also knew that Plaintiffs were quite familiar with the court procedures
and effective presentation of their case. They had immediate rapport and
credibility with the judge. The judge affirmatively stated that he believed he
could be unbiased and assured Mr. Baker, or at least led Mr. Baker to believe,
that if the judge was in fact biased, the matter could be dealt with on
appeal.

At best, this case demonstrates why even the appearance of

impropriety necessitates recusal:

Since the pro tern ruled in favor of

Plaintiffs with no discernable legal basis whatsoever, his decision appears,
particularly to lay persons, to be the product of bias.
clear, reversible error.

9

This constitutes

POINT II: THE COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING PLAINTIFFS5 SELFHELP "REPOSSESSION."
Once property is sold by one party to the other, the seller retains
no interest in the property without an express agreement between the parties.
A security interest could have been retained in the property sold by Plaintiff
only under Section 70A-9-101, et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended). Specifically, Section 70A-9-203 provides:
Security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or
third parties with respect to the collateral and does not
attach unless
(a) . . . the debtor has signed a security
agreement which contains a description of the collateral
It is undisputed that there was no written agreement between Plaintiffs and
Defendant.

It is also undisputed that Plaintiffs, without Defendant's

permission, retook possession of the property, depriving Defendant of is use.
This is clearly in violation of the law and, in fact, constitutes at least
conversion.
Since there was no written contract in this case, as required by
Sections 70A-2-2-1 and 70A-9-203, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended),
there could be no security interest as defined in Section 70A-1-201(37), Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). While the "savings" provision of Section
70A-2-201(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), may allow the
enforceability of a verbal contract, it does not supercede Section 70A-9-203,
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), nor does it sanction the enforcement
of a non-existent security interest.

10

Without a security interest, Plaintiffs' remedy is to sue Defendant
for a breach of the agreement to pay and then enforce that money judgment.
Without a security interest, Plaintiffs had no claim to the property.

The

court erred in sanctioning this illegal behavior by failing to dismiss Plaintiffs
Complaint, so that it might have been refiled n a court having jurisdiction to
order the return of Defendant's property.2

POINT III: THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THAT DEFENDANTS HAD WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO
DEFENDANT'S

TECHNICAL

DEFAULT

UNDER

THE

ASSERT
VERBAL

CONTRACT.
The contract at issue was entered into in April of 1986.

It is

undisputed that, from the beginning, Defendant had been sporadic in his
payments without significant complaint from Plaintiffs.

Defendant did,

however, routinely make large payments and was current through June 10,
1987. In fact, he had paid the equivalent of 14 of the 24 payments due under
the agreement. Although Defendant had not made the July 10, 1987, and
August 10, 1987, payments when Plaintiffs wrongfully took possession of the
property on August 14, 1987, Defendant had no reason to believe that
Plaintiffs would not accept payment as usual when he was able to pay.
Where a seller has routinely tolerated a buyer's default, the seller
waives strict compliance with the contract terms and must give notice before

2

The jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court is limited to the awarding of
money damages. (Section 78-6-l(l)(a), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended).)
11

demanding strict compliance. This rule was applied by the Utah Supreme
Court in the case of Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980). There,
the parties had contracted for Plaintiff to purchase a parcel of real property
from Defendants and the parties had specified specific contract terms. The
contract price was $40,000.00 with a down payment of $500.00, which payment
was made. When the first payment of $14,500.00 came due on May 1, 1977, it
was not paid. The parties discussed the purchaser's difficulty in obtaining
financing and in approximately June, 1977, the Defendant contacted an agent
for the purchaser and informed the agent that the check for the down
payment had been lost. A subsequent check for the down payment, plus
interest on the past due installment, was sent to the Defendant seller and the
seller made no complaint. Various discussions continued and in December of
1977, the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant to discuss financing problems and
the Defendant again represented that additional interest would be accruing
during the period of the delay. In February of 1978, the Plaintiff contacted
the Defendant to inform him that financing had been obtained, only to learn
that the Defendant had arranged for the sale of the property to another
purchaser.

The trial court found that the Defendant had waived the

requirement of strict compliance with the dates of payment set forth in the
earnest money agreement and that the waiver had been relied upon by the
Plaintiff.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's application of the

rule that after a waiver of strict compliance, "the seller must give notice and
a reasonable time to perform before he may insist upon holding the buyer
strictly to the time requirements."

612 P.2d at 347 (footnote citations

omitted).
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Under the facts presented by the Plaintiffs here, they clearly had
not given Defendant appropriate notice of their intent to declare him in
default.

Moreover, it is undisputed that at least in December of 1986 and

again in July of 1987, Defendant attempted to pay the obligation in full, but
these offers had been rejected by Plaintiffs, apparently because they could
not secure title to the equipment. The Plaintiffs owed more to their bank on
a loan secured by the equipment than they had agreed to accept from the
Defendant.

Consequently, it was clearly in Plaintiffs' economic interest to

accept as many payments as possible from Defendant while retaining title to
the equipment. It was not until the Defendant had paid the sum of $4,544.96
and had a balance remaining of only $3,246.40 that Plaintiffs chose to
"repossess." It is highly inequitable that the Defendants consistently allowed
late payments and refused tender of the entire balance, and then, without
notice, took possession of the property under the guise of Defendant's
default.

POINT

IV: EVEN

IF PLAINTIFFS

HAD A VALID

SECURITY

INTEREST, THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN AWARDING MONEY
DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS.
Assuming, arguendo, the existence of a valid security agreement,
the trial court erred in awarding what amounts to a deficiency judgment.
After repossession, a secured creditor may either retain the collateral in
satisfaction of the debtor's obligation as provided in Section 70A-9-505(2),
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), or the creditor may sell the
collateral and seek a deficiency judgment from the debtor pursuant to Section
13

70A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). However, if the creditor
seeks a deficiency judgment, the collateral must be sold and the sale must be
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. In this case, a deficiency
judgment was absolutely inappropriate, as no commercially reasonable sale
whatsoever had occurred. In fact, no sale of the property had occurred at
all.

It is undisputed that at the time of trial, the Plaintiffs retained

possession of the equipment.
As Plaintiffs failed to comply with the provisions of Section
70A-9-504 and 505(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), even if this
court should find a valid security agreement, the lower court's award of a
money judgment is inappropriate and must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The judge pro tern erred in failing to recuse himself in this action,
since he had previously represented the Plaintiffs in court. The trial court's
judgment must be reversed because of the pro tern's failure to recuse himself.
There was no written contract governing the sale of the property
by Plaintiffs to Defendant.
property.

Plaintiffs retained no security interest in the

The trial court erred in sanctioning Plaintiffs'

self-help

enforcement of a non-existent security interest.
Defendant had consistently been late in making his payments to
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had made no demand upon Defendant for payment prior
to retaking possession of the equipment. The trial court erred in failing to
recognize that, as a result of their consistent acceptance of late payments,
the Plaintiffs were estopped from "repossessing" the equipment without
14

advance warning to Defendant. Moreover, Defendant had twice tendered full
payment of the balance due.
Finally, even if this Court finds the existence of a valid security
interest, the trial court erred in awarding a deficiency judgment against
Defendant, since there was no commercial reasonable sale of the collateral
following its "repossession" by Plaintiffs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of March, 1988.
PARKEN & "KECK

By \ \ #

:

_^ jr

MhD.iy^n
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

Original signature
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K. B. Enterprises
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Original signature
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CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Approved by the Supreme Court of Utafy, March 1, 1974

CANON 2

A Judge Should
Avoid
Impropriety
and the Appearance of
Impropriety
in All His Activities
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should con&iict
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, oir other relationships to
influence his judicial conduct or judgment. Me should not lend the
prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor
should he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify
voluntarily as a character witness.
CANON 3

A Judge Should
Perform
the Duties of His Office
Impartially
and
Diligently
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other
activities. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed
by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply:
A. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence in it. He should be unswayeq by partisan interests,
public clamor, or fear of criticism.
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum, in proceedings before
him

(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his
official capacity, and should require similir conduct of lawyers,
2nd of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction
and control.

A-l

(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested
in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to
law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider
ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending
proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him
if he gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the
substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or
impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to his direction
and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making
public statements in the course of their official duties or from
explaining for public information the procedures of the court.
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto
during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that
a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes
of judicial administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of inves* titive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of
appropriate court proceedings.
B. Administrative Responsibilities
(1) A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and
facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilites of
other judges and court officials.
(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his
direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to him.
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may become aware.
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should
exercise his power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. He should not approve compensation
of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.
C. Disqualification.
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

A-2

(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy] or a lawyer with
whom he previously practiced law served during such association
as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judgjs or such lawyer
has been a material witness concerning it;
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary,! or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding;
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person;
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee
of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in
the proceeding;
(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself
about the personal financial interests "of his spouse land minor children residing in his household.
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according]to the civil law
system;
(b) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executoij, administrator,
trustee, and guardian;
(c) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal 6r equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or
other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that
holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities
unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;
(ii) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal,
or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities
held by the organization;
(iii) the proprietary interest of a policy holder ih a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest"
in the organization only if the outcome of ihe proceeding
could substantially affect the value of the interest;
(iv) ownership of government securities is a "financial interest"
in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could
substantially affect the value of the securities.
D. Remittal of Disqualification.
A judge may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose
on the record the basis of his disqualification. If, base^l on such dis-
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78-7-1. Disqualification for interest or relation to
parties.
Except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge
or justice of the peace shall sit or act as such in any
action or proceeding:
(1) To which he is a party, or in which he is interested.
(2) When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, computed
according to the rules of the common law.
(3) When he has been attorney or counsel for
either party in the action or proceeding.
But the provisions of this section shall not apply
to the arrangement of the calendar or the regulation
of the order of business, nor to the power of transferring the action or proceeding to some other
COUrt.
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Rule 63. Disability or disqualificatioiti of a judge.
(a) Disability. If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge
before whom an action has been tried is unable ^o perform the duties to be
performed by the court under these rules after a (verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly
sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform
those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those
duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may
in his discretion grant a new trial.
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil
or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file in affidavit that the judge
before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite
party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in
another judge to hear and determine the matter.
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is Known. If the judge against
whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to
another iudee (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction,
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. If the
judge against whom the affidavit is directed does nbt question the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds
that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be (tailed in to try the case or
determine the matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any case to file
more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are
made in good faith.
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70A-2-201. Formal requirements - Statute of
frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500
or more is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed
upon but the contract is not enforceable under this
paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in
such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time
a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such
party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other
respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to
others in the ordinary course of the seller's business
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably
indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made
either a substantial beginning of their manufacture
or commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but
the contract is not enforceable under this provision
beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has
been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted (section 70A-2-606).
i%5
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70A-9-203. Attachment and enforceability of
security interest - Proceeds, formal requisites.
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 70A-4208 on the security interest of a collecting bank and
section 70A-9-113 on a security interest arising
under the chapter on sales, a security interest is not
enforceable against the debtor or third partie^ with
respect to the collateral and does not attach unless
(a) the collateral is in the possession if the
secured pany pursuant to agreement, or the debtor
has signed a security agreement which contains a
description of the collateral and in addition, I when
the security interest covers crops growing or to be
grown or timber to be cut, a description of th£ land
concerned; and
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the
collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the
events specified in subsection (1) have taken place
unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a security agreement
gives the secured party the rights to proceeds provided by section 70A-9-306.
(4) A transaction, although subject to this
chapter, is also subject to the Utah Uniform (tonsumer Credit Code, and in the case of conflict
between the provisions of this chapter and the Utah
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the provisions of
the latter statute control. Failure to comply with any
applicable statute has only the effect which is Specified therein.
ism
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70A-1-201. General definitions.
Subject to additional definitions contained in the
subsequent chapters of this act which are applicable
to specific chapters or parts thereof, and unless the
:ontext otherwise requires, in this act:
(1) "Action" in the sense of a judicial proceeding
includes recoupment, counterclaim, setoff, suit in
equity and any other proceedings in which rights are
determined.
(2) "Aggrieved party" means a party entitled to
resort to a remedy.
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties
in fact as found in their language or by implication
from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance
as provided in this act (sections 70A-1-205 and
70A-2-208). Whether an agreement has legal
consequences is determined by the provisions of this
act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts
(section 70A-1-103). (Compare "Contract.")
(4) "Bank" means any person engaged in the
business of banking.
(5) "Bearer" means the person in possession of an
instrument, document of title, or security payable to
bearer or indorsed in blank.
(6) "Bill of lading" means a document evidencing
the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person
engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods, and includes an airbill. "Airbill" means
a document serving for air transportation as a bill
of lading does for marine or rail transportation, and
includes an air consignment note or air waybill.
(7) "Branch" includes a separately incorporated
foreign branch of a bank.
(8) "Burden of establishing" a fact means the
burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its nonexistence.
(9) "Buyer in ordinary course of business" means
a person who in good faith and without knowledge
that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership
rights or security interest of a third party in the
goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the
business of selling goods of that kind but does not
include a pawnbroker. All persons who sell minerals
or the like (including oil and gas) at wellhead or
minehead shall be deemed to be persons in the
business of selling goods of that kind. "Buying*
may be for cash or by exchange of other property or
on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract for sale but does not include a
transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or
partial satisfaction of a money debt.
(10) "Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed
it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NONNEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is
in larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a
telegram any stated term is "conspicuous." Whether
a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for decision by the court.

(11) "Contract" means the total legal obligation
which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this act and any other applicable rules of
law. (Compare "Agreement.")
(12) "Creditor" includes a general creditor, a
secured creditor, a lien creditor and any representative of creditors, including an assignee for the
benefit of creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver in equity and an executor or administrator of
an insolvent debtor's or assignor's estate.
(13) "Defendant" includes a person in the position
of defendant in a cross-action or counterclaim.
(14) "Delivery" with respect to instruments, documents of title, chattel paper or securities means
voluntary transfer of possession.
(15) "Document of title" includes bill of lading,
dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt or
order for the delivery of goods, and also any other
document which in the regular course of business or
financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the
person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold
and dispose of the document and the goods it
covers. To be a document of title a document must
purport to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and
purport to cover goods in the bailee's possession
which are either identified or are fungible portions
of an identified mass.
(16) "Fault" means wrongful act, omission or
breach.
(17) "Fungible" with respect to goods or securities
means goods or securities of which any unit is, by
nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other
like unit. Goods which are not fungible shall be
deemed fungible for the purposes of this act to the
extent that under a particular agreement or document unlike units are treated as equivalents.
(18) "Genuine" means free of forgery or counterfeiting.
(19) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned.
(20) "Holder" means a person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument or an
investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him
or to his order oir to bearer or in blank.
(21) To "honor" is to pay or to accept and pay,
or where a credit so engages to purchase or discount
a draft complying with the terms of the credit.
(22) "Insolvency proceedings" includes any assignment for the benefit of creditors or other proceedings intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the estate
of the person involved.
(23) A person is "insolvent" who either has ceased
to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business
or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is
insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankr-
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uptcy law.
(24) "Money" means a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government as a part of its currency.
(25) A person has "notice"' of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it;
or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known
to him at the time in question he has reason to
know that it exists.
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact
when he has actual knowledge of it. "Discover" or
"learn" or a word or phrase of similar import refers
to knowledge rather than to reason to know. The
time and circumstances under which a notice or
notification may cease to be effective are not determined by this act.
(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or
notification to another by taking such steps as may
be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course whether or not such other actually
comes to know of it. A person "receives" a notice or
notification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business
through which the contract was made or at any
other place held out by him as the place for receipt
of such communications.
(27) Notice, knowledge of a notice or notification
received by an organization is effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought
to the attention of the individual conducting that
transaction, and in any event from the time when it
would have been brought to his attention if the
organization had exercised due diligence. An organization exercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for communicating significant information to the person conducting the transaction
and there is reasonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an individual
acting for the organization to communicate information unless such communication is pan of his
regular duties or unless he has reason to know of
the transaction and that the transaction would be
materially affected by the information.
(28) "Organization" includes a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency,
business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, two or more persons having a joint or
common interest, or any other legal or commercial
entity.
......
(29) "Party,", as distinct from "third party,"
means a person who has engaged in a transaction or
made an agreement within this act.
(30) "Person" includes an individual or an organization (See section 70A-1-102). '
(31) "Presumption" or "presumed" means that the
trier of fact must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which
would support a finding of its nonexistence.
(32) "Purchase" includes taking by sale, discount,
negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or reissue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.
(33) "Purchaser" means a person who takes by
purchase.
(34) "Remedy" means any remedial right to which
an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort
to a tribunal.
(35) "Representative" includes an agent, an officer
of a corporation or association, and a trustee, exe-

cutor or administrator of an estate, or any other
person empowered to act for another.
(36) "Rights" includes remedies.
(37) "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or
performance of an obligation. The retention or
reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (section 70A2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation of a
"security interest." The term also includes any interest of a buyer of account or chattel paper which is
subject to chapter 9 The special property interest of
a buyer of goods on identification of such goods to
a contract for sale under section 70A-2-401 is not
a "security interest,7 but a buyer may also acquire a
"security interest" by complying with chapter 9.
Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a "security
interest" but a consignment is in any event subject
to the provisions on consignment sales (section 70A2-326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to
be determined by the facts of each case; however,
(a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does
not of itself make tpe lease one intended for security, and
(b) an agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee snail become or has the
option to become the owner of the property for no
additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for security.
(38) "Send" in connection with any writing or
notice means to deposit in the mail or deliver for
transmission by any other usual means of communication with postage or cost of transmission provided for and properly addressed and in the case of
an instrument to an address specified thereon or
otherwise agreed, or if there be none to any address
reasonable under the circumstances. The receipt of
any writing or noticje within the time at which it
would have arrived if properly sent has the effect of
a proper sending.
(39) "Signed" includes any symbol executed-or
adopted by a party yith present intention to authenticate a writing.
(40) "Surety" includes guarantor.
(41) "Telegram" includes a message transmitted by
radio, teletype, cable, any mechanical method of
transmission, or the like.
(42) "Term" means that portion of an agreement
which relates to a particular matter.
(43) "Unauthorized" signature or indorsement
means one made without actual, implied or apparent
authority and includes a forgery. '
(44) "Value." Except as otherwise provided with
respect to negotiable instruments and bank collections (sections 70A-B-303, 70A-4-208 and 70A4-209) a person gives "value" for rights if he acquires them
(a) in return for a binding commitment to
extend credit or for the extension of immediately
available credit whether or not drawn upon and
whether or not a chajge-back is provided for in the
event of difficulties in collection; or
(b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim; or
(c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a preexisting contract for purchase; or
(d) generally, in return for any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract.
(45) "Warehouse receipt" means a receipt issued
by a person engaged i^i the business of storing goods
for hire.
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70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of
collateral after default - Effect of disposition.
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its
then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of goods
is subject to the chapter on Sales (chapter 2). The
proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order
following to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking,
holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing
and the like and, to the extent provided for in the
agreement and not prohibited by law, the reasonable
attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by' the
secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured.by
the security interest under which the disposition is
made; (c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured.by
any subordinate security interest in the collateral if
written notification of demand therefor is received
before distribution of the proceeds is completed. If
requested by the secured party, the holder of < a
subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish
reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does
so, the secured party need not comply, with , his
demand.
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness,
the secured party must account to the debtor.;for
any surplus, and, ..unless otherwise , agreed, the
debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts o r chattel
paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus o r : i s
liable for any deficiency only if the security.agreement so provides.
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public
or private proceedings and may be made by way of
one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place
and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition
including the method, manner, time, place and
terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless

collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the
time and place of any public sale or reasonable
notification of the time after which any private sale
or other intended disposition is to be made shall be
sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not
signed after default a statement renouncing or
nodifying his right to notification of sale. In the
case of consumer goods no other notification need
be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to
any other secured party from whom the secured
party has received (before sending his notification to
the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his
rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the
collateral. The secured party may buy at any public
sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily
sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is
the subject of widely distributed standard price
quotations he may buy at private sale.
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured
party after default, the disposition transfers to a
purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights
therein, discharges the security interest under which
it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such
rights and interests even though the secured party
fails to comply with the requirements of this part or
of any judicial proceedings
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser
has no knowledge of any defects in the sale and if
he does not buy in collusion with the secured party,
other bidders or the person conducting the sale; or
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in
good faith.
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party
under a guaranty, indorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party or is subrogated to his
rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the
secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a
sale or disposition of the collateral under this
chapter.
1977
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70A-9-505. Compulsory disposition of collateral
- Acceptance of the collateral as discharge of
obligation.
(1) If the debtor has paid sixty per cent of the
cash price in the case of a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods or sixty per cent of the
loan in the case of another security interest in consumer goods, and has not signed after default a
statement renouncing or modifying his rights under
this pan a secured party who has taken possession
of collateral must dispose of it under section 70A-9504 and if he fails to do so within ninety days after
he takes possession the debtor at his option may
recover in conversion or under section 70A-9507(1) on secured party's liability.
(2) In any other case involving consumer goods or
any other collateral a secured party in possession
may, after default, propose to retain the collateral
in satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of
such proposal shall be sent to the debtor if he has
not signed after default a statement renouncing or
modifying his rights under this subsection. In the
case of consumer goods no other notice need be
given. In other cases notice shall be sent to any
other secured party from whom the secured party
has received (before sending his notice to the debtor
or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights)
written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral. If the secured party receives objection in
writing from a person entitled to receive notification
within 21 days after the notice was sent, the secured
party must dispose of the collateral under section
70A-9-504. In the absence of such written objection the secured party may retain the collateral in
satisfaction of the debtor's obligation.
(3) The above subsection shall not apply to pledgees receiving pledged property in the regular course
of business where the consideration received by the
pledgor for the property pledged is less than S100.
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440 East 8680 Soul
Sandy, Utah 84070 Phone 801-533-786
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December 21, 1987
K-B Enterprises
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84115.
Re:

K-B Enterprises v. Baker Construction; 874001233.
1987, Mark T Ethington, Pro Tern.

Written Opinion:

Heard November 18,

K-B Enterprises v. Baker Construction.

At the trial in this matter the defendant argued that, pursuant to subsection
(1) of section 70A-1-206 of the Utah Code, a written contract was required
in this matter and as there was no written contract the plaintiff has no cause
of action. It is the finding of the court that- section 70A-1-206 -'is not
determinative of this case. Subsection (2) of section 70A-1-206 provides
that, "subsection (1) of this section does not apply to contracts for the
sale of goods..." Goods are defined in section 70A-2-105(l) as "all
things...which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract..."
The bobcat in question was moveable so it would fall within the definition
of goods.
It appears instead that section 70A-2-201 is controlling subsection (1) of
section 70A-2-201 provides that, "except as"otherwise provided in this section
a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or more is not
enforceable...unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a
contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought..." Subsection (3) then provides that:
A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1)
but which is valid in other respects is enforceable...
(a) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits
in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a
contract for sale was made...
(b) with respect to goods for which payment has been made
and accepted or which have been received and accepted.
It is the finding of the court that the defendant admitted in court that
a contract for sale had been made and that payments were made for the
bobcat, it was delivered-to the defendant and he accepted it. Thus,
there was a valid and enforceable contract between the parties. The
defendant breached that contract by defaulting on his payments, and
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judgement is granted in the plaintiff's favor.
The next issue is the amount of damages the defendant is liable for. The
defendant is liable for the two payments of $324.64 that were in default.
When a payment is in default, the seller is entitled to recover that
payment no matter when repossession took place. However, the defendant
is only liable for damages that are reasonably foreseeable, and it is the
finding of the court that the $500.00 refinancing charge to the plaintiff
was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence at default
Judgement will be granted in favor of the plaintiff in the amount fo $649.28.
No costs will be awarded.
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Plaintiff
SMALL CLAIMS
JUDGMENT

vs.

Case No.

Defendant

This matter came before the court for hearing on the affidavi of plaintiff, and the defendant has been
served with the affidavit of plaintiff and order to defend, and eturn of service has been made. The
following parties appeared at the hearing:
•

K

Plaintiff only. The defendant failed to appear at the time set, and the defendant's default has been
entered.
Both plaintiff and defendant appeared and presented evidence.
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Court costs, and
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JUDGE

Both Plaintiff and Defendant received copies of the Judgment at Hearing.
%
TO THE DEFENDANT ONLY:
If the above judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff, you now have a judgment against you in
the Circuit Court in the amount specified above. If you are dissatisfied v/ith this judgment, you have only
FIVE (5) DAYS fronrvroooipt-of this notice to appeal the case to the District Court.
TO THE PLAINTIFF ONLY:
You should mail a copy of this judgment to the defendant IMMEDIATELY. The defendant has five
days frorrue&etpt-of the notice to appeal the case. You must complete the mailing certificate and file the
original of this judgment with the court before you can proceed with any further court action.
I hereby
eby certify that I mailed a copy of this judgment, postage prepaid, addressed to the above
named defendant(s) at
I,

.

/0r,

,„,„,.

A

Address &Jffi ^mj^

DatefL
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